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The problem. Most companies provide a certain number
of paid sick leave days for their employees. If employees
take paid sick leave days even when they aren't sick a high
absenteeism results. This is costly both in terms of direct
sick leave payments and loss of productivity. Incentives
for attendance might reduce absenteeism.
Procedure. Baseline absenteeism was determined. Next,
a bonus of $20 was made available for perfect monthly
attendance. Finally employees were offered a choice of
incentives for attendance.
Findings. The percent of absences decreased with the
introduction of both the bonus and the choice of incentives
conditions.
Conclusion. Incentives for attendance significantly
decreased absenteeism. Reduced costs for paid sick leave
days also occurred.
Recommendations. Incentives for attendance should be
implemented·in settings where employee absenteeism is high.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Anecdotal information suggests that the increase in
employee absenteeism has been a growing concern to em-
ployers. Absenteeism results in financial losses both
because of the resultant reduction in productivity and the
costs of sick leave benefits paid as wages for no work.
Employee absenteeism cost business and government $15
billion in sick leave benefits, alone, in 1973 (Gemmell,
1973). A number of factors may contribute to high employee
absenteeism, e.g. employees may actually be sick; they may
prefer non-work activities to work activities; or they may
avoid dull, repetitive jobs or unpleasant working conditions
by calling in sick.
Several techniques have been used to reduce absenteeism
in a variety of settings. swimming coaches who were con-
cerned about students' attendance at practice sessions, con-
structed a large waterproof display board on which swi~~ers
indicated their attendance by entering checkmarks in the
appropriate spaces. This system of publicly posting self-
recorded attendance reduced absenteeism by 45% (McKenzie &
Rusha11, 1974).
Lottery systems have also successfully reduced
absenteeism.
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Employees of an electronic manufacturing firm
who were present at work every day for a one-month period
were allowed to place their names 1.'n a dran om drawing. On
the last day of every month, one name was drawn to win a ten
dollar cash prize. Sick leave payments decreased by 30.6%
(Wallin & Johnson, 1976). In another lottery system, each
employee received a playing card each day (of a 5-day work
week) he or she came to work. The employee with the highest
poker hand won $20.00 at the end of the week. Absenteeism
was reduced by 18.27% (Pedalino & Gamboa, 1974).
Direct monetary bonuses have also been successful in
reducing absenteeism. In a manufacturing company, 46 female
employees who engaged in stitching and sewing operations
received slips of paper every day they attended work. Five
slips of paper could be exchanged for 50 cents. Absenteeism
was reduced from 3.94% to 2.56% per week (Orpen, 1978).
In a large manufact.uring company, a program consisting
of incentives for good or improving attendance coupled
with disciplinary procedures for excessive absenteeism was
implemented by management in an attempt to reduce absentee-
ism among 7,500 union workers. Incentives for good or
improving attendance consisted of: (1) freedom from the
h . 1 k (2) approved time offrequi remen t to puncl the t.Lme c r oc ;
without pay~ (3) a reduction in position on the scipl
ary ladder for excessive absenteeism. The disciplinary
ladder consisted of verbal warnings, written warnings and
3
probationary periods leading to termination of Iemp oyment.
An employee could be reduced from a written warning level
to the lesser level of a verbal warning. Absenteeism was
reduced from 7.8% during baseline to under 4% during imple-
mentation of the program (Kempen & Hall, 1977).
The present study explores the problem of employee
absenteeism in a pre-school setting. The pre-school was
located in a prime service area and served approximately 100
children from low income families of several ethnic back-
grounds. The acquisition of federal monies for the pre-
school's daily operation was based on specific teacher/
child ratios. The required ratio varied according to the
number and ages of children who attended the pre-school on
a given day. Required ratios are shown in Table 1. The
actual teacher/child ratio varied daily depending upon the
number of teacher absences as well as the attendance of the
children. Representatives of the federal government would
occasionally make spot checks to see if required teacher/
child ratios were being met. The pre-school's administra-
had become concerned wi. th the frequency of employee
absenteeism when it found that teacher/child ratios were not
being met. Inadequate ratios would both reduce federal
grant monies and prevent the pre-school from acquiring a
state license. The funding situation did not allow the
pre-school administration to hire substitute employees when
permanent employees were absent.
4Table 1
Required Teacher/Child Ratios for each Age Group of
Children
Age Group
2
3
4
5-6
Number of
Children
4
6
7
8
Required Number
of Staff
1
1
1
1
5
Several factors at the pre-school may h.·a·v·e contributed
One factor was low salaries. Throughout
the study salaries ranged from $3,100 to $11,800 per year
to absenteeism.
depending upon an employee's education and experience.
Certified teachers at the top of the pre-school's salary
scale often made $3,000 less per year than certified
teachers in the public school system. Employees may have
felt that, since their salaries were so low, taking sick
leave when they were not really sick was justified.
A second possible contributing factor was the diffi-
cult working conditions. The pre-school was housed in an
old church. Dividers such as desks and children's lockers
were used to separate the different age groups from one
another which resulted in a noise problem. The building was
not air-conditioned and temperatures in the summer would
often reach 100 0 indoors. In the winter, the heating sys-
tem was controlled by the landlord and was never properly
regulated. Employees may have found working conditions so
aversive that they preferred staying home.
A third possible factor contributing to employee
absenteeism was a process referred to as "pooling". Groups
at the pre-school consisted of 15 to 30 children, one head
pending on ratio requirements.
teacher, one assista teacher and one or more aides de-
If an absence occurred in a
. d t . t' requl.'red teacher/child ratios,group, l.n or ero mal.nal.n ...
another employee was pulled from his or her job, e.g.
6
cooking, to work with that group. The absence of even one
employee resulted in important jobs being left undone, addi-
tional stress and in over-worked employees.
A fourth possible factor contributing to employee
absenteeism was the health condition of the children and,
consequently, of the employees. Contagious illnesses and
parasites were often present at the pre-school, e.g. body
lice, head lice, ringworm, chicken pox and/or the measles.
Infected children would often come into contact with
employees before the nurse had an opportunity to conduct
her daily inspection of the children. Employees may have
been sick more often than they would have been had they been
working in another environment. However, the pre-school's
administration felt that most absenteeism was caused by the
aversiveness of unpleasant working conditions, low
salaries and pooling rather than by actual sickness.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
SUbjects
Employees of the Child Development Care Center, Inc.,
located in Des Moines, Iowa, participated in this study.
At the beginning of the study the employees consisted of
one male and eight females ranging in age from 18 years to
60 years old. Employees came and went over the course of
the study, there were never less than nine employees nor
more than sixteen. Positions held by the employees con-
sisted of head teachers, assistant teachers, aides, cooks
and assistant cooks.
Absentee Policy
Each employee accumulated 1.25 sick leave days in his
or her sick leave account each month. If an employee was
absent for a day (and had an accumulation of days in the
sick leave account) he or she was paid for that day and one
day was deducted from the total in the account. Employees
were not paid when they were absent if they did not have
days in their accounts. No more than 15 sick leave days
Id b 1 t d year a.nd· no mo·r·e t·.han 30 sick leavecou ·e accumu·ae per
days could be accumulated at any time during an emp
total length of employment. Employees were told per cally
8
by the administrator r on hoth an individual an ""~u group basis I
that their rates of absenteeism would be re·v· ;e···..e·d h·
.... w wen merit
raises were determined. Other leave consisted of 3.33 days
per year for funeral leave 5 to 20 days per year for
vacation depending upon the length of service.
Observation and Recording
An absence was defined as four or more consecut.ive
hours missed in anyone eight hour day. The number of
absences for each employee and Whether the absence was paid
or unpaid was recorded by the experimenter from daily sign-
in sheets. The annual salary of each employee was recorded
by the experimenter from payroll records.
Reliability
A second observer counted the number of absences per
employee in each 3 month period. An agreement was scored
when both observers recorded the same number of absences.
Reliability was calculated by dividing number of agreements
by the sum of agreements and disagreements and multiplying
by 100 percent. Reliability was 100% for the 17 reliabi1-
ity observations made
Procedures
The pre-school's established absentee
l· n. effect f·ro·rn. January 1977 through August 1979.policy was
Bonus Program.
might be effec
were. asked what incentivesEmployees
b teel' s m Theyin reducing their a sen . .
9
suggested days off, bonuses and earning s . 1peC~a items, e.g.
T-shirts, pop, etc. The administration chose to use bonuses.
All permanent employees ",Jere eligible for the bonus program
if they had a minimum of five days accumulated in their
sick leave accounts and indicated their desire to participate
in writing. This minimum was established to safeguard
employees against not receiving sick leave pay for an
actual illness. A participating employee who had no
absences for a full calendar month received an extra $20.00
instead of accumulating 1.25 sick leave days in his or her
sick leave account. Since the average monthly salary after
taxes was $458.00 (block 10), $20.00 was thought to be a
substantial bonus. Any participating employee who was
absent during the month did not receive $20.00 but
accumulated 1.25 sick leave days instead. Initially
employees were allowed to go on or off the program every
month. In order to avoid administrative problems this was
changed to every three months. With the exception of block
11 (September 1979), employees could elect to join the
bonus program or to remove themselves from the program at
designated four times during the year, i.e. every three
months beginning in October. This condition was in effect
for 13 months.
Choice.Program. In the second experimental condition
h d· " t t' p··ro·v·l'.d··ed· se·v·e·r··a·l. l'n·centives from whicht e amlnlS ralon .
eligible employees who indicated their sire to partie
10
could choose. A different choice could be made at the
beginning of each 3-month period. Empl·;
. ··oyees could choose
to:
1. receive a $20.00 paymerrt; each month without an
absence
2. take one day off following a month without an
absence
3. receive a lump sum payment of $75.00 at the end
of three months without any absences.
4. take three days off all at once following three
months without any absences
5. choose one of the three alternatives below for
each month without an absence (employees had to
specify which alternative they wanted for each
month of the three-month period)
one T-shirt with the name and address of the
pre-school on it
one lunch at a restaurant with the Director
one month's supply of pop in the employee's
choice of flavors, two per day
Any participating employee who was absent during a
month did not receive incentive but accumulated 1.25
si leave days. Employees had the opportunity to remove
themselves from the program once every three months.
Experimental condition two was in effect for a per of
six months.
The experimental design was a
Iech was also a muls, ABC design,t
e across since emp opted to
c in program at various
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The percent of work days each employee was absent dur-
ing blocks of time was calculated by dividing the number of
absences by the number of available working days. All
blocks, except block II, span 3 calend.ar months. Block 11
represents one month. These data are shown for employees
1-8 in Figure 1 and for employees 9-16 in Figure 2. Con-
siderable variability occurred during baseline both within
and between employees. Some employees (employees 5 and 6)
were absent as much as 15% of the time (about 3 days per
month) in some three month blocks and as little as 0% of
the time in others. Other employees' absences were less
variable! for examp ,employee 11 was absent from 2% to
3% of the time (about J days per month) r employee 4 was
absent from 0% to 3% of the time and employee 8 was never
absent. Some employees vlere absent much more than others,
for example the mean percent of absences in baseline for
employee 5, 14, 6 and 13 was 9%, 9%, 6% and 6% respectively;
while mean percent of absences for employees 1, 4 and
12 was 2%, 1% and 1% respective Figure 3 shows that the
mean t of ences over all employees in basel was
4%.
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Figure 3. The percent of absences for all employees
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employeesWhen the bonus program was implemented, only
I, 2, 3 and 4 were eligible to join and all chose to go on
the program. Their mean baseline absences were 1 6% 20-
.. , ""0 I'
2.7% and .88% respectively. Absences immediately decreased
to 0%. Absences for employee 1 remained at 0% for 13
months and absences for employees 2 and 3 remained at 0%
for 10 months.
Employee 4: and, later, employee 5 chose to go on, off
and back on the bonus program in a design similar to a
reversal design. Employee 4 was on the program during
blocks 11 and 12. Absences remained at about the same low
level of baseline, approximately 1.5%. When employee 4: went
off the program the percent of absences increased to 5%.
Absences returned to the original level when employee 4:
returned to the bonus program. The mean percent of absences
for employee 5 during baseline was 7.5%. Employee 5 was on
the program during block 13i absences decreased to 0%. When
employee 5 went off the program the percent of absences
returned to 6%. Absences decreased to 3% when employee 5
returned to the bonus p r oqr am , Figure 3 shows the percent
of absences for employees on the bonus program remained at
0% for 4: consecutive blocks and then increased to 2.2% in
block 15 while the percent of absences for employees off
increasedthe bonus program, i.e. still in baseline, steadi
from 2.6% in the 11th block to 6.7% in the 15th block.
When the cho of incent s pro "..ras implemented f
16
employees 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6., 7 and 16 were eligible to join;
all but 3 and 16 went on the program. Employee 3 resigned
from work and employee 16 chose not to go on the program.
Absences decreased to 0% for employees 2, 4, 5 and 6 and
remained at 0% for the 6 months the program was available.
The percent of absences for employee 7 and 1 was 0% during
the first three months of the program, but increased during
the second three months (block 17) to 2% and 16% respec-
tively.
Employees 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 chose to go on the choice
program as soon as they were eligible (block 17). The per-
cent of absences for employees 8, 10 and 12 was 0% during
block 17. The percent of absences for employees 9 and 11
was 10% and 2% respectively during block 17. Employees 13,
14 and 15 never became eligible for the program. Employee
16 never chose to go on the program even though she was
elig Le , Figure 3 shows the percent of absences for all
employees who were in the choice program was 0% in block 16
and 2.6% in block 17. The percent of absences for em-
ployees off
in block 16 and 6.4%
ram· ~ e s.. tl'll ]~n. bas·eline,· was 3.6%t, ..L. • .
block 17. These functions are
essentially allel with a mean difference of 3.,7%.
Table 2 shows the alternatives chosen by employees in
choice of incentives program. During block 16, employee
3 chose the $20 incentive and employees 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7
chose the $75 lump sum. During block 17, employees 2 and 6
17
·Table 2
A.l ternatives Chosen by Employees During the Choice of
Incentives Program for each Three Month Block
-
Option Block 16 Block 17
$20 payment Employee 3 Employee 2, 6, 9 ,
10, 11
1 day off after
month
$75 after 3 Employee 1, 2 , 4 , Employee 1, 5, 7 ,
months 5 , 6 , 7 8
off after Employee 123 days
3 months
3 Employee 4choice of
alternatives
18
changed from the $75 lump -sum to $20- emp.l.
, oyee 4 changed
from the $75 lump sum to the choice of th .1..
ree aternatives,
employee 12 chose 3 days off, and empl0·y·ees 1, 5
and 7
remained with the $75 lump sum. Sixteen (out of 18)
choices
were for money incentives and ten of those choices were for
the higher-risk higher-pay-off incentive, which required 3
months of perfect attendance.
The average number of days worked per sick leave day
taken was plotted for employees on and off the program.
This was calculated by dividing the number of days worked
by the number of absences for all employees and dividing the
total by the number of employees. If an employee had taken
a sick leave day each time he or she had accumulated one :
he or she would have taken one sick leave day every seven-
teen days. Figure 4 indicates that employees on the program
worked more days per sick leave day taken than employees off
the program throughout both the bonus and choice programs.
the mean days worked per sick leave day taken for employees
on the ogram was 58 during the bonus program and 56 during
the choice program. The mean days worked per sick leave
d taken for employees off the program was 32 during the
bonus program and was 34 during the choice program.
The total percent of sences for all employees com-
bined was calculated by totaling the number of absences and
div i.d i.nq by the total possible work days. Figure 5 shows
I' nqed fromthe total percent of absences during base~ne ra -
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Figure 5. The total percent of absences for all
employees during baseline and when the bonus pay and choice
of incentives programs were available. All blocks, except
block 11, 3 calendar months. Block 11 represents 1
month.
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2.2% to 6.3 % wi th a mean 0"£ 4%• When the bonus pay program
was available absences ranged from 1. 2% to 4.5% with a mean
f 2 6% When the choice of' J..' ncentJ..'veso . . ~ program was avail-
able absences ranged from 2.2% to 3.5% with a mean of 2.9%.
overall absenteeism decreased with the introduction of both
the bonus and choice programs even though not all employees
chose to go on the incentives programs.
The upper portion of Figure 6 shows the average annual
salary of employees over three month blocks. The average
annual salary was calculated by totaling the annual
salaries of all employees working in a given 3 month block
and dividing by the number of employees. The average annual
salary steadily increased from $5,300 to $8,900 over the
period of this study. The increase reflected both inflation
and the that proportionally more certified teachers
were
of e s
D teacher assistants or aides) in the
HI .....d d Le tioD Figure 6 shows the mean cost of
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arrive at a daily
rate. of sences for each
Ii his or her ly pay rate.
rates were divided by the
number of each block
during mean cost of 5 leave
1000
8000
fl)1000
s,
.9 8000
"5o eooo
4000
3000
2000
22
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
35
!O
25
20
.5
10
&:
O~ ...-. +- r- _
9°I
75
70
65
60
55
m 00
I-
o 45
"0 40
a
I
I
I I
"i.r-c.:IIII I
I I
I I
I 2 3 4 5 6 1 EI 9 10 If 12 13 14 15 t6 17
Blocks of three months
e 6. 1 repres s the average annual
~a ing baseline bonus and choice of
incentives rams were available. The le panel repre-
mean actual cost of s ave p to each em-
pI duri se1ine mean actual cost si
pIu s cost of incentives bonus pay and of
inc snt .en a ve s prams. Lowe r 1 s
cost~ for flation and disproportionate
of high salaried s. All bloc
span 3 cal ar months. BI 11
month but was JUs (rnuLt. Li
a 3 month bi
23
made to each employee. During bonus pay and choice pro-
grams the mean sick leave payments plus the mean cost of
incentives (e.g. $20, $75, cost of pop) were plotted for
each three month block. The mean cost of absenteeism in-
creased from $54 in block 1 to $92 in block 17.
The bottom portion of Figure 6 shows the mean cost of
absenteeism for each employee corrected for inflation and
the disproportionate hiring of high salaried employees.
During baseline this was calculated by dividing the be-
ginning average annual salary ($5,300) by the average annual
salary for each three month block and then multiplying this
percent by the actual mean costs of absences per employee
for each three month block. During bonus pay and choice
programs this was calculated by adding the mean cost of
absenteeism for each employee to the cost of incentives and
dividing by the number of employees for each three month
block. correc costs were fair stable across all
cond ions. The mean was $41 while the costs ranged from
$20 in bl 11 to $66 in block 17.
The top rtion of Figure 7 shows the average number of
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The bottom portion of Figure 7 shows the mean daily
enrollment of children for each 3 month block. This was
calculated by totaling the mean daily enrollment of
children for each 3 month block and dividing by 3. The
mean daily enrollment of children increased with the intro-
ducti.on of both the bonus pay and choice programs. The
average daily enrollment was 75.1 in baseline, 81.8 in the
bonus pay program and 93 in the choice program. Blocks 2,
7 and 15 (F igure 7) include the month of September. Block
11 represents the month of September only. During September
the pre-school loses a large number of kindergarten children
due to their entering the first grade. Actual teacher/child
ratios were not plotted due to the difficulty in obtaining
the actual and required ratios for each day. Each age
group requi a different ratio and children arrived at
and left the pre-school at different times during the day.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
hTflether the bonus and choice of incentives programs
were effective in reducing absenteeism was not fUlly veri-
fied in this study because the basic experimental design
was a simple time series. However, four facts suggest that
the bonus and choice programs did produce a change in
employee behavior: (I) in terms of a multiple baseline
across employees, most employees I absenteeism decreased at
the time they chose to go on a proqram r (2) the data of
employees 4 and 5 provided a successful reversal design;
(3) employees on program consistently had less absentee-
ism employees off program; (4) overall
absenteeism the incentive programs were
available even though s had to less in
~ct~,~l bl in to become eligible for
an ive am. For instance loyees who did not
have an accurnu tion of f s leave days in their sick
leave account to first accumulate those s before
COll te in an incentive
Of i es a of from \vhich
to choose is anal s to a rein rcer menu or a
Q~nrA, i.e. it draws on
27
conditioned reinforcement. Employees could choose the in-
centive (e.g. $20, a T-shirt, a day off) most appropriate
to their current deprivation. It is difficult to tell
whether the choice of incentives program reduced absentee-
ism in this particular setting any further than no choice
$20 bonus program. Since most employees preferred monetary
incentives {16 of 18 choices} providing a range of non--
monetary incentives may have been unnecessary_
Most incentive programs for reducing absenteeism have
required partie ipation by all employees. One problem with
mandatory participation is the reluctance of employee unions
to allow incentive programs because of the possibility of
their interference with contract negotiations (Pedalino &
Gamboa, 1974). Another problem is the possibility of
employee resentment of forced participation which could
result in various emotional behaviors. The implementation
of voluntary programs could avoid both se problems _ The
volunt program described re appeared to reduce absentee-
ism even though not all employees chose to be on the program
all the
Absenteeism costs employers both ave
ss ~~~~~uctivity. When costs were correc
and the disproportionate hir of sa
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sick leave days taken. Mo.re importantly, productivity in-
creased. The average number of employees on the payroll
remained fairly constant throughout the study but since
employee absenteeism decreased, overall teacher/child ratios
were better, the renewal of a state license was possible,
the allocation of federal monies was continued and more
children were enrolled in the pre-school.
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